CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

Communist Bloc - Africa: Khrushchev is expected to make his long-delayed visit to Africa this year and has accepted invitations from Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Togo, and Ethiopia. He appears to be angling for bids from Libya and Sudan. The rapid expansion over the past two years of bloc activities in the newly independent countries south of the Sahara reflects the Communist leaders' conviction that Africa has become one of the most important arenas in the East-West contest. Exclusive of the UAR, the number of bloc diplomatic missions accredited to African countries rose from only two in 1954 to 45 at the present time in line with the increase in independent countries. Since 1959, the bloc has extended economic credits to Ethiopia, Tunisia, Guinea, and Ghana totaling approximately $275,000,000. Bloc governments have also extended or offered gifts of aircraft, arms, hospitals, schools, and food supplies to Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Libya, and the Congo. In addition, bloc countries now have operative trade agreements with seven African nations and they carry on trade with seven other countries without formal agreements. There are at least 500 bloc technicians serving in Africa on a contract basis.

USSR: Approximately 7,000 tons (7 KT) of high explosives will be detonated simultaneously in the slopes of a gorge of the Malaya Almaatinka River this year to build a dike to protect the city of Alma Ata from flooding, according to a report in Izvestia by Mikhail A. Lavrentyev, a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The plan to use a massive explosion
New Guinea is the
site of the US-Indonesian arms mission to Moscow, to support President
Sukarno in every possible way.

Iran: The parliamentary elections which are sched-
uled to begin today in Tehran are likely to be accompanied
by extensive demonstrations and possibly by violence. Na-\ntionalist agitators demanding free elections have attracted
large crowds in Tehran, and some Communist instigation is
also reported. The most extensive demonstrations so far
have involved university students, some of whom have been
arrested. The regime is attempting through censorship to
prevent the dissemination within the cities of reports of dem-
onstrations against electoral rigging in the provinces, where
elections have been taking place since mid-January. The
government appears alert to the inherent dangers, and
American advisers believe the police should be able to con-
tax disturbances.

Cuba: Cuban Education Minister Armando Hart is form-
ing "International Literacy Brigades" composed of teachers
from other Latin American countries to participate in Cuba's
effort to "wipe out illiteracy" in this "year of education." The
teaching manuals used in this program, one of which was ob-
tained by Guantanamo naval base authorities, are clearly
Communist authored. The regime's drive to orient the illit-
eracy campaign and education generally to "the policy of the
state and the realities of the revolution" may prefigure state
control of all educational institutions.
to dam the Almaatinka has received considerable publicity in Soviet news media over the past year and was discussed by the Soviets at the nuclear test ban conference in Geneva in May 1960. The explosion will undoubtedly be studied extensively from a seismological standpoint. Such a study will increase Soviet knowledge of industrial explosions and of seismic detection of explosions in a particular geological medium. Theoretically, it should also increase Soviet ability to conduct clandestine nuclear tests in that medium.

Communist China - North Vietnam: Despite its growing economic difficulties, Communist China continues to extend large-scale economic aid to neighboring bloc countries and to a few underdeveloped nations in the free world. On 31 January Peiping signed its latest aid agreement providing for an additional credit equivalent to $157,000,000 to North Vietnam as China's initial contribution to the support of Hanoi's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65). During the past year, China has committed itself to well over $500,000,000 in grants and credits to other countries. Recent agreements include loans to Cuba and Burma of $60,000,000 and $84,000,000 respectively—the largest credits the Chinese have granted outside the bloc. In addition, smaller credits have recently been offered to Nepal, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Guinea. More than $400,000,000 has been extended to the three Far Eastern satellites in 1960 and 1961.

South Vietnam: A "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" has been established, according to Radio Hanoi, with a manifesto calling on all South Vietnamese to work for the overthrow of President Diem. The front is intended by the North Vietnamese to give organizational substance to their efforts to unite all anti-Diem elements in

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South Vietnam. Hanoi is attempting to preserve the fiction that this front is a spontaneous movement and not an instrument of the Communists.

Congo: Katanga President Tshombé reportedly signed on 30 January a military alliance with Albert Kalonji, chief of the South Kasai Mining State, based on mutual recognition as autonomous states. Tshombé apparently hopes that this move, in addition to strengthening his own military position, will induce the Leopoldville government to join the two dissident states against Gizenga and thus indirectly recognize their claims to autonomy. It is unlikely, however, that Kasavubu will accept Katanga and South Kasai as anything but provinces of the central government. [French Colonel Trinquier has reportedly been offered the post of commander of Katanga's military forces and is now on his way to Brussels to discuss the appointment.]

There is no confirmation of press reports that the Moroccan contingent in the Congo has received orders to stop preparation for withdrawal. Such a reversal appears improbable.

Nkrumah on 31 January showed Ambassador Russell a telegram he had sent to Hammarskjold which said that Ghana's troops would remain in the Congo until the UN Conciliation Committee makes its report—which is not expected until late February.

Indonesia: Foreign Minister Subandrio has reiterated to the American ambassador that lack of American support
Laos: The two Soviet AN-12's which flew to Haiphong several days ago returned to Peiping on 1 February and are expected to continue on to the USSR on 2 February. These heavy transport aircraft presumably flew supplies into Haiphong in support of the airlift into Laos. Airlift operations into Laos continued through 1 February.

*Communist China has made it quite apparent that it does not favor any immediate return of the International Control Commission (ICC) to Laos. Speaking at a 31 January banquet for a North Vietnamese trade and economic delegation visiting Peiping, Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai said "even to reactivate the ICC, it will be necessary immediately to convene an international conference of all countries concerned." Chou did not specify an international conference limited to the nations participating in the 1954 Geneva conference. Instead, he still seemed to favor an expanded conference of "all countries concerned" similar to the one proposed by Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk. Chou made it quite clear, however, that Peiping would insist that any group convened to seek a solution to the Laotian crisis deal only with Laos' ex-Premier Souvanna Phouma. The USSR has also indicated its reluctance to accept an immediate reactivation of the ICC in Laos without a prior international conference.

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future]

B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future]

C. [Communist forces in Laos generally retain the initiative and are increasing their capability to extend offensive operations; the continuing bloc airlift has provided a stockpile of supplies believed in excess of immediate requirements. These forces are apparently prepared for prolonged military operations but it is uncertain whether major attacks will be made in the near future]

D. [The bloc, the UAR, and African nationalists are continuing their efforts to increase the scale of their material aid to the pro-Lumumba pro-Communist regime in Stanleyville. The success of these efforts appears to hinge in large measure on obtaining]

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TOP SECRET

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transit rights from the Sudan. The withdrawals of several UN contingents, the continuing momentum of the political and military activity of the Stanleyville regime, and the continued failure of anti-Lumumba leaders to settle their own differences and their efforts to seek foreign assistance outside the UN framework are combining to contribute to continuing fragmentation of the Congo.
Bloc Gains in Africa

Bloc efforts in Africa have concentrated on increasing diplomatic and cultural contacts, extending credits and aid offers, and promoting trade. Since 1959, bloc governments have extended economic credits of $110,000,000 to Ethiopia, $105,000,000 to Guinea, $8,000,000 to Tunisia, and $50,000,000 to Ghana. In addition they are known to have offered credits to Sudan, Central African Republic, Morocco, and Libya, and are reported to have at least indicated a readiness to do the same for Togo and Mali. Bloc countries have operative trade agreements with Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mali and carry on trade without formal agreement with the Somali Republic, the Malagasy Republic, the Union of South Africa, Libya, Cameroun, Nigeria, and Liberia.

Mali presents an illustration of the way the bloc moves in the newly independent countries. Since last August, when Senegal withdrew from the Mali Federation two months after it had gained independence, Mali has established or is in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Bulgaria, and North Vietnam. Prague has signed preliminary trade and technical assistance agreements with Mali, and a Soviet economic mission has recently been in the country studying possible aid projects. No commitments have yet been announced, but the Czechs reportedly have offered a long-term, low-interest credit and four transport aircraft, and have agreed to construct certain industrial enterprises and conduct mineral surveys.

Sino-Soviet radiobroadcasts to non-Arab Africa total 76 hours weekly. An additional 62 hours beamed to other areas are also intended for African audiences.

Scholarships and technical study grants are an important part of the bloc's African program. Many of these are extended through the World Federation of Democratic Youth.
(WFDY), which has affiliations with about 45 local African groups. Approximately 1,000 Black Africans are studying at bloc universities.

Mali, Algeria, Guinea, and Morocco have received bloc arms, and arms offers have been made to Ethiopia, Ghana, and Sudan. The USSR and Czechoslovakia provide all of Guinea's arms and military assistance, including training for at least 60 Guinean youths in these two bloc countries.
Probable area of 700 ton HE detonation in early 1960.

Approximate site of planned 7000 ton HE detonation

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USSR Plans Detonation of 7,000 Tons of High Explosives

The Almaatinka explosion, as presently planned, would be the largest detonation of high explosives known to have been undertaken to date in the USSR. As such, it gives indication of Soviet proficiency in the use of directed explosives techniques and the USSR's continued reliance on these techniques, rather than conventional mechanical earth-moving methods, for industrial operations in difficult terrain.

At the Geneva Conference in May 1960, the Soviets stated they expected to use two explosions to do the job--one of 600 tons to be set off in the fall of 1960, and one of 3,500 tons to be set off sometime in 1961. M. A. Sadovskiy, head of the Soviet Scientific Group, stated that these explosions were "being carried out at such depths as to preclude venting." Later, however, he explained to one of the US scientists that he had meant they would not form craters rather than that they would not vent into the atmosphere. The recent announcement of the planned 7,000-ton blast appears to reflect further study of the Almaatinka project by Soviet experts, perhaps as a result of data acquired from a 700-ton contained experimental detonation conducted probably near Osh early in 1960. Technical details for the new Almaatinka explosion are not known.

The proposed explosion is also of widespread interest because of its applicability to research aimed at improving the seismic detection of underground nuclear tests. At the Geneva scientific meetings in May 1960, the Soviets included the Almaatinka explosions as part of their contribution to a coordinated US-UK-USSR seismic research improvement program. Later the Soviets withdrew from the program. However, Soviet seismologists are known to have used data from at least two other kiloton-equivalent explosions--one industrial and one experimental--in their studies of seismic detection and identification problems. They have compared their own seismic data from explosions and earthquakes with those provided them by the US on its underground nuclear tests. The so-called Osh explosion seems to have been undertaken, at least in part, for similar reasons.
Peiping Expanding Foreign Aid Program

The new economic aid agreement with Hanoi was signed in Peiping by a North Vietnamese economic mission which has been touring the bloc for more than two months in search of aid for its ambitious First Five-Year Plan, which began this year. Last December in Moscow, this mission also concluded a new aid pact with the USSR which will provide a $112,000,000 credit to finance equipment and technical assistance for North Vietnam. Total Sino-Soviet bloc aid to North Vietnam since 1953 stands at about $900,000,000--$365,000,000 from the Soviets and $457,000,000 from the Chinese.

This aid has amounted since 1955 to about one third of Hanoi's annual budget. The new credit will most likely be invested in further development of North Vietnam's light industry.

In addition to its extensive aid program for Asian Communist countries, Peiping has committed over $200,000,000 in loans outside the bloc. More than $40,000,000 has been made available to Cambodia and Nepal, and an offer--originally made in 1959--of $30,000,000 to Indonesia has been revived.

China has also given assistance--largely financial--to the Algerian rebel movement and the pro-Lumumba forces in the Congo.
Hanoi Publicizes Launching of United Front In South Vietnam

North Vietnam has become increasingly open in its efforts against the Diem government in the South through a combination of intensified guerrilla warfare and political agitation. Last September Ho Chi Minh's top lieutenant, Le Duan, publicly called for the formation of a broadly based united front in South Vietnam to combine all segments of the population. Hanoi's leaders apparently hope the front will become a focal point for the growing but as yet unorganized opposition in the South. They probably also hope the front will lead to the formation of a coalition government in the South as an interim measure designed to bring about reunification of Vietnam on Communist terms.

Instructions to clandestine Communist elements in South Vietnam called for proclamation on 20 December of the front and instructed agents to stage demonstrations and disseminate propaganda. At that time the Communists appeared sufficiently confident of their control in some areas to permit public announcement of local front committees. They warned, however, that the situation was "fraught with difficulties" and cautioned against identifying the front with the name of the party. This may explain Hanoi's delay of more than a month in publicizing the front and why Hanoi radio quotes a Reuters dispatch from Saigon and the Cambodian press as the sources of its information.

Strong emphasis in the front's manifesto, as reported from Hanoi, on a program of land reform, expanded agriculture, and the removal of rural grievances over the Diem government's forced labor and rural resettlement projects suggests that a major objective of the front is to consolidate political support in areas now controlled or actively penetrated by the Communist guerrillas. Reports of civilian demonstrations against the Diem government in many rural areas since mid-December are indicative of some success in this endeavor, as well as in provoking reprisals from government military forces.

instructed Communist agents to establish contacts with non-Communist opposition
leaders sympathetic to the abortive coup against Diem in November. Some remnant factions of the once influential Dai Viet party reportedly have agreed to cooperate and may become identified with the new united front. Despite Hanoi's efforts to disguise the front as a spontaneous local movement, however, most prominent non-Communist opposition leaders in the South are likely to spot the manifesto's close parroting of Communist objectives and to remain aloof. Moreover, Hanoi radio's claim that the manifesto has been widely disseminated throughout the South has not been verified by other sources and is open to some question.
Situation in the Congo

[Negotiations between Leopoldville, Bakuwanga (South Kasai), and Elisabethville for a military alliance have been going on for some time, but Kasavubu has been unwilling to give in to Tshombé's conditions, which include a recognition of Katanga's sovereignty. Tshombé has now reportedly agreed that Leopoldville may have jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, and finance once a military alliance is signed, and a group representing the Belgian minister of African affairs believes such an alliance can be formed, setting aside the question of sovereignty until later.]

[It appears unlikely, however, that Tshombé and Kasavubu will reach agreement on this subject. Katanga was the first province to secede from the Congo, Tshombé having made it plain even before Congo independence on 30 June 1960 that he would take Katanga out of any Congo republic with a central government. Although he has been bitterly disappointed by the lack of international recognition of his regime, even from Belgium, whose economic interests have given him strong support, he has remained firm in his intention not to join any government other than a loose federation. On the other hand, reports indicate that Kasavubu is so opposed to Tshombé as an independent leader that he would continue to oppose the Katanga government's pretensions even if Tshombé's forces should attack Gizenga.]

[The appointment by the Katanga Council of Ministers of French Colonel Trinquier to replace a Belgian colonel as commander of the Katangan Army could reduce the army's effectiveness. Trinquier reportedly accepted on the condition that the Belgian cadre officers remain. Although most of the junior Belgian officers and NCOs may stay, the high-ranking ones almost certainly will leave. Trinquier is reported planning to import 15 to 20 French officers to hold key positions in the army, and one to be attached to each ministry of the Katangan government. The native soldiers, who disliked but respected the Belgians, may not respond easily to French officers. In view of Trinquier's appointment, the French may now provide Tshombé with nine jet trainers which they have reportedly been withholding since 26 January. Tshombé opposed Trinquier's appointment. This evidence of his weakness, or any marked deterioration of the army]
at this time, when the Katangan regime is increasingly threatened by Baluba tribesmen and pro-Lumumba forces in northern Katanga, could result in Tshombé's replacement by his rival, Deputy Premier Jean Kibwe.)
Indonesian Foreign Minister Reports on Moscow Visit

Foreign Minister Subandrio in his talk with Ambassador Jones admitted that there were risks in Djakarta's accommodation with the bloc but denied any basic change in Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy. He said any military man in Indonesia would prefer American arms to Soviet arms, but "we had no alternative."

Subandrio quoted Khrushchev as stating, "We will support your President Sukarno politically, militarily, economically, and psychologically. We will give him anything he wants. All he has to do is ask for it. We will support him all down the line." Subandrio claimed the Russians did not argue about terms during the January arms negotiations and told the Indonesians not "to bother" if they found it difficult to meet payments.

Subandrio admired the skill of Soviet officials in apparently convincing Army Chief of Staff General Nasution, leader of the arms mission, that they were genuinely interested in assisting him with the New Guinea problem. At the same time, however, he praised the behavior of Nasution, who, on being chided by Khrushchev on being "pro-American," had replied that he was not pro-American but pro-Indonesian and also anti-Communist.

Subandrio's statement that arms purchases negotiated in January totaled between $200,000,000 and $250,000,000 tends to confirm reports from other sources which have set the figure at $244,000,000.
Polling in Tehran May Lead to Violence

Iranian nationalists are making one of their strongest bids in recent years to re-establish themselves as a political force. Tehran University students led by agitators from the National Front, a coalition of nationalist groups, have been demonstrating during the past week for freer elections.

Four Tudeh groups, which were formerly operating independently, are now coordinating their activities to aid the National Front. Tudeh leaders are said to be receiving orders from the Soviet Embassy, and some direction through Soviet radiobroadcasts. Extensive demonstrations are expected when voting begins in Tehran on 2 February and may provide the Iranian security forces with one of their severest tests in recent years. Security officials in Tehran, who until recently have been complacent regarding the elections, are showing signs of nervousness as the voting deadline approaches. Student demonstrations have been increasing, and over 30 of their leaders have been arrested.

National Front leaders probably do not desire violence. Twelve front leaders have taken asylum in the Senate building to dramatize their protest over police closure of their club, the arrest of students, censorship, and lack of free elections. Mozafar Baqai, a nationalist leader arrested during the abortive election campaign last August for making street speeches demanding free elections, is again making provocative speeches and attracting audiences as large as 5,000 persons. In contrast, meetings of progovernment groups have failed to draw sizable crowds.

The government is censoring news of incidents in the provinces protesting the use of its influence to elect favored candidates for fear that such news would aggravate the situation in Tehran. Voting has been taking place in the provinces since mid-January, and about 112 of the 200 deputies have been elected.
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